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Abstract: 
This article assesses the significance of domestic and foreign savings for China`s economic 
growth. Using annual data for the period between 1981 and 2009 a three-gap model is 
formulated and estimated. The model illustrates quite vividly the centrality of the fiscal effort 
constraint to the achievement of a higher growth rate in the long-term. In particular, it 
highlights improvements to the analytic process along with a simulation experiment conducted 
with the model developed by us, finding the economic transition in China at the crossroads, 
which is the dilemma between the original economic structure and the aims of Twelfth-Five 
Plan over 2011-2015. These findings suggest Chinese government relative adjustment policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After more 3 decades of significant and substantive adjustment programs, an intense debate has 
arisen about how the past and future effects of adjustment policies influence macroeconomic 
performance in China. The aim of this study is to add another voice to this controversy based 
on the prospective of three-gap. 
There are more scholars who analyses the constraint of every gap impacting on economic 
growth using three-gap model in order to offer selecting program of macroeconomic 
performance.  
F.M.MWEGA NJUGUNA MWANGI and F. OLE WE-OCHILO (1994) use a simple 
analytical framework to study whether it is the saving, fiscal or foreign exchange gap which is 
the binding constraint on capacity growth in Kenya and how these gaps have evolved since the 
early 1970s. They find that, for plausible intermediate import ratios, foreign exchange is the 
binding resource constraint to potential growth in Kenya. Thus, its increased availability 
through exports promotion and more concessionary capital inflows and the associated reduction 
of import compression would alleviate the saving, fiscal, and external gaps that undermine 
good macroeconomic performance. Sepehri and et al.(2000) simulate a model and illustrate 
quite vividly the centrality of the foreign exchange constraint to the achievement of a modest 
growth rate in the medium-term. Zafar Iqbal and et al. (2000) use a three-gap framework to 
explore the contributions to macroeconomic performance of the adjustment policy reforms and 
external shocks. Thilak Ranaweera(2003) uses a three-gap framework which focuses on the 
major imbalances of the economy for evaluating police choices facing Uzbekistan. ARDESHIR 
SEPEHRI and et al.(2005) assess the significance of domestic and foreign savings for 
Vietnam’s economic growth. ECLAC(2005) considers that there are three policy options to 
overcome the balance-of-payments constraint. The first is to call for an overhaul of the current 
international financial arrangements. The second is to change the relationship between the 
export and import elasticity parameters. The third is to attract foreign savings. CARICOM 
countries have opted for the third solution. Thanoon, Baharumshah & Rahman(2006) develope 
an open economy model to identify which of the gaps—savings, foreign exchange, and 
fiscal—become the binding constraints in the adjustment process of Malaysia as it strives to 
sustain economic growth in the post crisis era. 
Our analysis is quite different perspective from researchers who analyses macro China 
Economics using three-gap model (Cai Sifu, 2003; Zhang Hejie and Chen Weili, 2007, 2008; 
Zhang Hejie and He Yanqing, 2011) . 
China implemented a series of economic reforms in the late 1970s, which have collectively 
become known as renovation. Markets became increasingly accepted as the principal 
mechanism of resource allocation, and there was, as a consequence, a steady erosion of the role 
of central planning and its two main institutions, agricultural production co-operatives and 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Among other things, reform sought to redirect industrial policy 
by seeking to enhance the role of the private sector, while at the same time vigorously pursuing 
external trade liberalization and internal de-regulation, including changes in agricultural 
markets, public sector restructuring, and financial sector reform. Moreover, at several critical 
points in the reform process the state undertook macroeconomic stabilization apart from several 
years, such as the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
It is generally acknowledged that China`s transition from plan to market was a relative success, 
when compared to many other transitional economies. Its style ‘gradualism’ brought about by a 
series of reforms implemented in the late 1970s and 1980s. Whatever might be the reason for 
the successful transition, China was firmly on a high growth path. From 1981 to 2009, the 
average annual rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) was 7.5 per cent, exports 
soared, net export levels accounted for almost 16.1 per cent of GDP, growth was driven by 
unprecedented levels of investment, which reached a high of 37.6 per cent of GDP, as the 
market economy modernized the efficiency of its productive structure, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) levels accounted for almost 5.5 per cent of gross investment.  
The East Asian crisis reduced the demand for China`s exports in 1998, FDI flows in 1999 and 
2000. Real GDP growth rate fell to 5.3 and 4.0 per cent per annum, in 1998 and 1999, 
respectively. Consumer prices continued to fall, and the inflation rate was negative in 1998 and 
1999. However, there has been no published systematic analysis of the relative importance of 
domestic and external resources in providing the foundations that underpinned investment and 
growth in China in the 2000s. Neither has there been an in-depth analysis of the domestic and 
foreign resources required for China to meet its medium term GDP growth target of 7-9 per 
cent per annum from 2011 to 2015. This article try to fill these gaps by assessing the role and 
significance of domestic private, government and foreign savings on China`s economic growth 
over the medium term.  
The article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 specifies the 
three-gap model. In Section 3, the results from the estimation of the model is presented and 
discussed along with a simulation experiment conducted with the model developed by us. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
2. A THREE-GAP MODEL 
To assess the relative importance of domestic and external resources on China`s economic 
growth this section specifies a three-gap model of growth along the lines suggested by Bacha 
(1990), Taylor (1993) . The analysis draws heavily on the methodological framework by 
ARDESHIR SEPEHRI and A HAROON AKRAM-LODHI (2005). According to the three-gap 
model, the utilization and expansion of existing productive capacity is constrained not only by 
domestic and foreign savings, as was initially discussed by Chenery and Strout (1966) in the 
context of the two-gap model, but also by the impact of fiscal limitations on government 
spending and thus on its public investment choices. In the context of a low-income transitional 
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economy such as China, public sector saving and investment play a crucial role in determining 
the productive capacity of the economy and its growth rate. Moreover, the urgent need for the 
reconstruction of infrastructure  and years of neglect under central planning have reinforced 
the crucial role of public investment in restoring and maintaining a healthy growth path. 
However, in the absence of well-developed financial markets in China at present, the available 
methods of financing public investment are mostly confined to budget surpluses and inflation.  
While such a highly aggregated one-sector model has its own obvious limitations it is well 
suited to low-income transitional economies, where economies continue to operate at less than 
full capacity, mainly as a result of the lack of availability of foreign exchange such as China 
before 1993 and other structural bottlenecks. In contrast to macroeconomic growth models of 
full employment, the three-gap model explicitly considers the interaction between capacity 
expansion and capacity utilization. Moreover, the limited data requirement of the model makes 
it well suited to countries such as China, where the coverage and availability of time series data 
is very limited. Gap analysis of course assumes that the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) 
and other behavioral parameters are fixed at least in the medium-term or study term and that 
there is limited substitution between domestic and foreign resources.  
The formulation of model is presented in Table 1. All variables in the model are defined as a 
percentage of potential output (Q), which will be estimated in the following section by the sum 
of GDP (or real value-added) and the maximum Industrial Value Added of some month in 
calculated year times 12 for the period between 1981 and 2009. Equation (1) defines real output 
(X) as the sum of GDP and real intermediate imports (Mk). Following Taylor (1993) output is 
here defined in a somewhat non-standard fashion, reflecting the importance of intermediate 
imports in the early stages of industrialization and agricultural modernization for a low-income 
transitional economy such as China. Capacity utilization (u) is defined by equation (2) as a ratio 
of output (X) over potential output (Q). The rationale for working with (X) and (Q) as separate 
variables is that, as noted above, many transitional economies often operate at less than full 
capacity, such as the average value of capacity utilization u in China in the period between 
1981 to 2009 is only 60.2 per cent per annum. Rather than setting output equal to productive 
capacity, as was done in early two-gap models, utilizing excess capacity to raise output allows 
an exploration of the way the three gaps interact in the process of economic growth during 
transition. 
Output growth is determined along Harrod–Domar lines, according to which the rate of growth 
of potential output (g) is specified in equation (3) as a linear function of the investment rate (i), 
which is in turn defined as investment as a percentage of potential output. The parameter (k) 
denotes the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR), while (go) denotes other factors affecting 
the rate of growth of output, such as labor productivity growth. Equation (4) states the 
equilibrium condition, or savings constraint, according to which investment (i) is equal to 
savings (s). Total investment in equation (5) is specified as the sum of private investment (ip) 
and government investment (ig).  
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Equation (6) specifies total savings as consisting of private saving (sp), public sector saving (sg) 
and foreign saving (sf). Private investment is defined in equation (7). It is assumed that private 
investment varies with changes in demand conditions, as measured by (u), and with 
government investment. Private sector investment can vary positively with government 
investment, a so-called ‘crowding-in’ effect (a significant proportion of government investment 
is in infrastructure, public utilities and basic industries which raise the profitability of private 
investment), or negatively with government investment, a so-called ‘crowding out’ effect 
(which occurs when the government borrows heavily from the banking system, thereby limiting 
the amount of loanable funds available to the private sector as found by various studies, for 
example cited in Ndulu (1990)), depending on whether these two types of investment are 
complements or substitutes. Private savings are defined in equation (8) and are specified in a 
standard way, according to which savings are assumed to vary positively with the capacity 
utilization variable (u). 
Public sector savings are defined in equation (9) as the difference between the fiscal effort 
variable (z) and interest payments on the foreign debt of government (ζj*), where ( j*) denotes 
interest payments on foreign debt and (ζ) the share of government. In equation (10) the variable 
(z) defines the fiscal effort rate, also known as the public sector operating surplus, which is that 
sg plus ζj*. According to equation (10), the public sector operating surplus is assumed to be 
primarily determined by the capacity utilization rate (u). The strength of this response is 
measured by the parameter (z1), the marginal fiscal effort rate. In addition to the rate of capacity 
utilization, the fiscal effort rate is influenced by other factors such as size of the tax base and 
the effectiveness of tax collection system. The strength of these other factors is captured by the 
parameter (zo). Equation (11) defines the public sector borrowing requirement (πu), or the 
public sector saving constraint, as the difference between government investment (ig) and 
public sector saving (sg). Note that in equation (11), the public sector borrowing requirements, 
PSBR, expressed as a proportion of Q. This is equal to the PSBR/actual output ratio, π, 
multiplied by the capacity utilization rate with PSBR targets usually set against the actual rather 
than potential output. Formally, PSBR/Q= PSBR/X* X/Q=πu= ig - sg. PSBR was measured by 
annualized budget deficits (F.M.MWEGA NJUGUNA MWANGI and F. OLE WE-OCHILO, 
1994). 
The external sector is summarized by equations (12) through (14). The import demand for 
intermediate goods (mk) is specified as a function of the capacity utilization rate (u) in equation 
(12), while import demand for capital goods (mz) is specified as a function of domestic 
investment (i) in equation (13). Equation (14) defines foreign savings, or the balance of 
payments constraint. The first part of equation (14) defines the current account deficit as 
competitive imports (m) plus intermediate imports (mk) plus capital goods imports (mz) plus 
interest payments on foreign debt (j*) less exports (e). The capital account is presented in the 
second part of equation (14), where (δ) denotes the ratio of foreign debt over potential output 
and (Δδ) changes in the ratio of foreign debt over potential output, (g) is the growth rate, (r) the 
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ratio of other capital inflows—such as FDI—over potential output, and (Ø) total capital inflows 
as a percentage of potential output. Exports and capital inflows are treated as exogenous 
variables. 
The growth-investment equation, as well as the three gap equations, is presented in the lower 
panel of Table 1.In equation (15), government investment (ig) and the capacity utilization rate 
(u) are treated as variables that can be traded off to give macroeconomic equilibrium, meaning 
that the growth rate of capacity output (g) can be treated as a target policy variable. Indeed, as 
explained above, one of the innovative features of the three-gap model in the context of a 
transitional economy is its explicit consideration of the interaction between capacity expansion 
and capacity utilization. This specification of growth may be more relevant in circumstances 
where structural and foreign exchange bottlenecks (such as China before 1993) prevent the full 
utilization of existing capacity. Equation (15) thus relates government investment (ig) to the 
capacity utilization rate (u) and targeted potential output growth ( g ). The savings gap 
equation (16) gives the maximum government investment attainable from a given rate of 
capacity utilization (u) that satisfies the equilibrium condition defined in equation (4). 
Assuming that government and private investment are complimentary, higher total government 
investment increases private investment and capacity utilization, thereby generating sufficient 
savings to finance the higher investment. Moreover, even if total government investment 
crowds out private investment, as long as the crowding out effect is incomplete higher 
government investment will increase capacity utilization. According to the foreign savings gap 
equation (17), there is a trade off between government investment (ig) and the capacity 
utilization rate (u). Higher capacity utilization generates a higher demand for intermediate 
imports that can only be met, given available foreign exchange, by cutting into capital goods 
imports and hence by lowering the growth rate of capacity. Lastly, the fiscal gap equation (18) 
shows government investment (ig) and the capacity utilization rate (u) moving together as 
higher capacity utilization generates more net fiscal revenue that can be channeled into capital 
formation. 
3. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
3.1. Estimated Parameters 
The model specified in Table 1 was estimated using annual data for the period between 1981 
and 2009, using an ordinary least-squares technique. Data sources and definitions are presented 
in the Appendix and the data itself is presented in Appendix Table A1. Using the estimated 
values of the parameters and the values of the exogenous variables, the model was calibrated 
for 2005, the resulting three-gap equations are shown in Table 2. 
In light of the diagnostics, the overall results of the estimated behavioural equations in Table 2 
are satisfactory. The estimated parameters for private investment suggest that the capacity 
utilization rate is statistically significant determinants of private investment. The positive sign 
of the government investment variable indicates that government investment is a complement 
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to private investment but the effectiveness is weak. The negative sign of the lagged government 
investment variable suggests that it seems to crowd out actual private investment, and the 
effectiveness is weaker than former. The synthetic effectiveness seems that private sector 
investment can vary positively with government investment, but the ‘crowding-in’ effect is 
rather weak. 
The economy would be in macro balance in a given time period if the three gap equations 
intersected at one (u, ig) point which can be brought about by an upward shift of the fiscal gap 
equation; a downward shift of the savings gap equation and/or a leftward shift of the foreign 
exchange gap equation. The size of the gap triangles can therefore be used to measure the 
degree of macro imbalances in a given period in the economy. 
The capacity utilization variable also appears to be a statistically significant determinant of 
private saving, fiscal effort and intermediate imports. Thus, the greater the degree of productive 
activity in the economy, the greater the rate of private savings, which can be used to finance 
investment; the greater the rate of government revenue collection, and the greater the rate of 
imports which are used as inputs in productive activity. It can be noted that the estimates for 
intermediate imports indicate a low degree of dependence on imports. Finally, the estimates for 
imports of capital goods demonstrate that the marginal propensity to import with respect to 
capital formation is statistically significant. It is also relatively small, especially considering the 
negative sign of the lagged capital goods variable, indicating China`s low degree of dependence 
on imported capital goods. China`s higher current account surplus which supports its higher 
economic growth exhausts itself not richer resources per capita. 
Figure 1 demonstrates a sharp trade-off between government investment and capacity 
utilization under the foreign exchange constraint. The fiscal constraint line is positive, as the 
stability condition of equation (4) is satisfied, and is flatter than the savings constraint line. This 
indicates that the government fiscal constraint is more binding than the private saving 
constraint as more foreign capital becomes available. In such circumstances, an attempt to raise 
government investment in order to stimulate economic growth will be frustrated by the lack of 
taxes. If more taxes than ever are available, it would reduce the private saving, investment and 
consumption, continuing to frustrate private welfare as ever. The result will be that China`s 
economic growth would not be sustainable in long-term, considering that, from 1995 to 2009, 
the average of growth rate of China`s tax revenue is 13.5%. Although, in the same time, the 
average of growth rate of private savings is 11.5%, and private income 10.7%, the ratios of 
taxes by private income are greater than ever from 10.2% of 1995 rising to 17.7% of 2009, the 
average value is 13.6%, see Figure 2. It seems that the economic transition in China is just 
at the crossroads, and maybe it would bring up the dilemma between the original 
economic structure and the aims of Twelfth-Five Plan over 2011-2015? 
As Figure 3 indicates, the estimated growth path of potential output is sensitive to the time 
period used. There is output gap between potential and actual growth rate from 1981 to 1983, 
1983 to mid of 1987, and 1989 to 1991. The vales of actual output are in 1981, 1986 and 1990, 
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respectively. The relative peaks over period are in 1983, 1988, 1993, 1995 and 2008, 
respectively. From 2000 to 2009, the growth rates of actual outputs are almost equal to the 
growth rate of potential output.  
There seem five business cycles over estimated period. From 1981 to 1983, the probable cause 
of the business cycle is unknown. From 1983 to 1991, the main cause is chaos in China`s 
economic situation, for example, commercial banks could operate any business, such as 
investment in real estate and stock market etc. From 1991 to 1995, Premier Zhu Rongji made 
the hyperinflation “soft land” by way of three-year effort to improve the economic environment 
and rectify the economic order. From 1995 to 2000, the Asian crises made China`s export 
declines, and influenced the economic situation. From 2000 on, because of financial crisis of 
late 2007, China`s economic growth started decline in 2008, see Figure 3 and Table 3. Where is 
the valley of China`s business cycle from now on? A question is that the active fiscal policy of 
4,000,000 millions RMB could not prevent the decline from the crisis? These questions would 
be debated in another paper.  
A question would have been asked: whether or not China would accomplish its Twelfth 
Five-Year Development Plan over 2011-2015 under the trend of decline of potential growth 
rate? If can, what would Chinese government do? 
3.2. Simulation Results 
Using the estimated values of the parameters, the model is simulated for the period between 
2010 and 2015, which corresponds closely to the Government’s Twelfth Five-Year 
Development Plan. The purpose of the simulation is to evaluate the role and significance of 
domestic and foreign savings on possible growth projections over the medium run. The 
underlying assumptions and the results of these simulations are summarized in Table 4. 
Equation (3) was estimated using annual data for the period between 1981 and 2009, using an 
ordinary least-squares technique. We can get g0= -0.156, and k=0.574, see equation (19).  
0.156 0.574g i                               (19) 
t  (0.534)  (0.559)                          
2 0.013R  , D.W.= 2.05 
Assume g＝9%，u＝85%, get ig=1.59%, based on equation (15) considering keeping harmony 
society in China. 
ln( ) 0.274 0.983*ln( )y g                     (20) 
t  (-0.540)   (4.31)                          
2 0.482R  , D.W.= 1.33 
Where, y indicates the real growth rate of actual GDP (
kGDP M ), and g the growth rate of 
potential GDP, assume g= g＝9%, get y=7.1% over the coverage of 2010 to 2015.  
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In order to keep ip=40% over the period between 2010 to 2015, we need to raise autonomous 
component of private investment (io) from -0.12 to 25.54 by way of improving investment 
environment and bank reform and economic marketization etc.，because the parameter (io) 
captures the strength of these factors. Higher investment rates also increase imports of capital 
goods (mz) and intermediate goods (mk) to 0.009 percent and 0.007 percent per annum over the 
period between 2010 to 2015, respectively. These increases in imports would not result in 
projections of a current account deficit. To finance higher investment in general, and private 
investment in particular, the private savings rate is projected to grow by as much as 34.6% over 
the period between 2010 and 2015.   
Higher capacity utilization and the broadening of the tax base is also projected to increase 
government tax revenues, the steady reduction in tariff rates under the China`s economic open 
would reduce the fiscal effort rate while the broadening of the tax system would increase the 
fiscal effort rate (z1) . Because the parameter (z0) captures the strength of other factors, such as 
size of the tax base and the effectiveness of tax collection system, we would raise z0 from 0.200 
to 1.4992 by 2015 by way of getting the taxes from capital revenues and mono-enterprises of 
SOEs not from salary or wage income, and z1 from 0.011 to 0.100 in order to rise fiscal effort 
rate z to 1.584 by 2015, the growth rate of z would rise to 29.6% per annum.                                                                                       
Summation of the results of scenario is as Table 5. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this article has been to assess the relative significance of domestic private 
savings, domestic public sector savings, and foreign savings on China`s economic growth. 
Using annual data for the period between 1981 and 2009 a three-gap model has been 
formulated and estimated.  
Firstly, the government fiscal constraint was shown to be more binding than the domestic 
private savings constraint. The capacity utilization rate is positive to private investment and 
saving, government investment seems to crowd in private investment in merely weak 
effectiveness. The rate of government revenue collection is positive to the rate of imports which 
are used as inputs in productive activity. Intermediate imports and capital goods are a low 
degree of dependence on imports, seeming that China`s economic growth is main dependence 
on domestic market. 
Secondly, to assess the significance for China of the foreign exchange and domestic savings 
constraints the model was simulated for the period between 2010 and 2015. The medium-term 
simulation was undertaken a path scenario.  
The size of the fiscal gap under the growth path scenario illustrated quite vividly the centrality 
of the fiscal effort constraint in general on China`s ability to achieve a socially acceptable rate 
of growth in the medium-term. It indicates the economic transition in China at crossroads, 
and it is the dilemma which, on the one hand, Chinese economic structure required to boost the 
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growth rate of output results in much higher levels of public savings than the period 1981-2009 
in order to complete the Twelfth-Five Plan; on the other hand, it is not suitable for setting up 
harmony society if no deeper reform is carried because of Chinese lower income comparing 
with most countries in the world.  
These findings suggest Chinese government adjustment policies as below. 
4.1. Encouragement in private investment 
Chinese government should improve relative investment laws and rules and policies, withdraw 
its investment from non important resource for the people's livelihood, improve investment 
environment and bank reform and economic marketization etc. in order to encourage private 
investment.  
4.2. Tax reform 
Adjustment in the gap in work wages through reform of individual income tax. It is possible for 
the most Chinese can get more disposable income of residents than ever by increase in the 
earnings threshold for the individual income tax. The taxation mode of personal income tax 
should be transformed from classified collection system to mixed collection system. Reform 
taxation for part rich men not to be imposed. Collect capital revenue. Taxation should be fair, 
tax steal and evasion reduction. 
Reform in enterprise income tax. It should be gradually transformed from single fixed tax rate 
to progressive tax rate. Authority should reduce the small and medium-sized enterprise tax 
burden pressure, reduce the state-owned monopoly enterprises retained profit and increase their 
turning over to the country for dividends, increase the resource tax levy. 
“Fixed assets investment regulation tax” should again open window of reform in China. Reduce 
the duplication of investment, high-pollution and high energy-consuming and consumption of 
resources enterprises and industries. Further increase the high-tech enterprise income tax 
preferential measures. Improve enterprises the interest to the public sector investment and its 
enthusiasm of development of remote regional economy. 
4.3. Optimization in the structure of fiscal expenditure 
It is positive effect to real national income for fiscal expenditure to invest livelihood and public 
affairs which could effectively reduce the residents prudent savings, especially the projections 
of education, medical and health work, and social security. Government should reduce its 
expenditures, such as reductions in staff of government and “Sangong consumption” 
(Consumption of public funds on three major private purposes-cars, banquets and oversea visits) 
and environment pollution; increases in productivity and eco efficiency, and employment rate; 
encouragements in low-carbon work and living; offers in safer product and service in order to 
increase private consumption rate. 
4.4. Raise in investment to natural resources of other countries 
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China should invest more natural resources abroad in order to keep sustainable development of 
China`s economic growth and protect domestic natural resources. 
Further studies prospectives seem that why is the route of China`s economic structure 
adjustment so slow? Whether or not the way of China`s economic structure adjustment could 
be quicker? 
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APPENDIX1: DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES  
Potential output (Q) was estimated as follow over the period 1981–2009. 
Q＝GDP+B 
Where B is the maximum Industrial Value Added of some month in calculated year times 12. 
Private savings (sp) were estimated as a residual from the Keynesian national income identity, 
which can be written in normalized form as: 
sp = i–(sg+sf) 
where other terms are as they are defined in the text.  
All real variables are in 2005 prices. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic data: 1981–2009 
                                                                  
Year  GDP     X      Q       i       ip     ig     sp     z     mk    mz 
                                                                           
1981  6,163   6,441   18,035  0.067    0.048  0.019  0.076  0.105  0.005  0.004 
1982  5,690   5,939   20,336  0.065    0.050  0.015  0.064  0.082  0.003  0.002 
1983  5,918   6,147   21,965  0.065    0.049  0.015  0.063  0.087  0.003  0.002 
1984  5,838   6,105   24,032  0.062    0.048  0.014  0.063  0.087  0.002  0.002 
1985  5,572   5,850   26,798  0.059    0.049  0.009  0.054  0.094  0.002  0.004 
1986  5,298   5,551   29,904  0.054    0.046  0.008  0.049  0.069  0.001  0.003 
1987  5,568   5,850   33,355  0.052    0.046  0.007  0.052  0.050  0.001  0.002 
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1988  6,672   7,076   37,071  0.056    0.051  0.005  0.058  0.028  0.002  0.002 
1989  7,110   7,421   40,057  0.046    0.042  0.004  0.058  0.018  0.001  0.002 
1990  5,833   6,091   8,918   0.158    0.144  0.014  0.222  0.074  0.004  0.006 
1991  5,868   6,207   8,660   0.174    0.162  0.012  0.247  -0.048  0.005  0.006 
1992  6,795   7,194   10,117  0.202    0.193  0.009  0.261  -0.137  0.005  0.008 
1993  8,288   8,644   12,153  0.252    0.243  0.009  0.280  -0.157  0.004  0.009 
1994  7,367   7,690   10,351  0.263    0.255  0.008  0.311  -0.287  0.003  0.008 
1995  9,328   9,709   12,770  0.247    0.239  0.007  0.303  -0.195  0.004  0.006 
1996  10,657  11,042  14,155  0.247    0.240  0.007  0.304  -0.194  0.004  0.006 
1997  11,588  12,025  15,231  0.243    0.237  0.007  0.313  -0.176  0.004  0.005 
1998  12,212  12,611  15,718  0.264    0.253  0.011  0.312  -0.166  0.003  0.005 
1999  12,699  13,189  15,959  0.264    0.248  0.016  0.312  -0.152  0.004  0.006 
2000  13,591  14,349  17,467  0.260    0.243  0.017  0.304  -0.138  0.006  0.007 
2001  14,612  15,373  18,821  0.269    0.251  0.018  0.301  -0.072  0.005  0.008 
2002  15,783  16,651  20,845  0.283    0.264  0.020  0.300  -0.011  0.005  0.009 
2003  17,415  18,602  24,109  0.312    0.297  0.014  0.301  0.049   0.006  0.010 
2004  19,967  21,685  28,192  0.330    0.316  0.014  0.307  0.116   0.007  0.011 
2005  22,366  24,485  32,199  0.359    0.343  0.016  0.308  0.157   0.008  0.011 
2006  25,756  28,309  37,330  0.387    0.372  0.015  0.306  0.228   0.008  0.012 
2007  31,868  34,974  45,742  0.408    0.392  0.016  0.310  0.332   0.009  0.011 
2008  41,004  45,044  57,969  0.412    0.394  0.018  0.300  0.316   0.010  0.010 
2009  45,367  48,742  64,531  0.517    0.490  0.026  0.318  0.334   0.008  0.008 
                                                                             
Notes: 
From i to mz are as a proportion of potential output (Q) 
GDP=gross domestic product (in a hundred millions of USD, constant 2005 prices). 
X=real output (real GDP+intermediate imports). 
Q=potential output. 
i=investment. 
ip= private investment. 
ig=public sector investment. 
sp=private domestic saving. 
z=fiscal effort (sg+ ζj*). 
mk=intermediate goods imports. 
mz=capital goods imports. 
The data were obtained from various sources: Real GDP, the components of GDP by sector and ownership, 
investment, savings, exports and imports were obtained as below. 
1. database on DRCNet: http://data.drcnet.com.cn/web/default.aspx 
2. Network station of National Bureau of Statistics of China， 
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http://www.stats.gov.cn 
3. 《CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2010》，edited by National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010.9, First 
Version. 
4. The amount of repayment of government debt, note: From the year of 2000,data in the table represent the 
Principal Payment for Debts; since 2006, as the management of bal balance has been taken, this index has no 
longer been in State budget again 
5. Sina-Finance http://finance.sina.com.cn/mac/#nation-9-0-32-2 
 
APPENDIX 2: 
Table 1. Specification of the three-gap model 
                                                                   
Real output: 
KX GDP M                                       (1) 
Capacity utilization: X
u
Q

                                  (2) 
Growth rate: 
0g g ki                 g0>0 or g0<0; k>0       3) 
Equilibrium: i s                                           (4) 
Total investment: 
p gi i i                                     (5) 
Total saving: 
p g fs s s s                                     (6) 
Private investment: 
0p gi i i u          α>0 or α<0; β>0        (7) 
Private saving: 
0 1ps u             σ0>0 or σ0<0; 0<σ1<1       (8) 
Public sector saving: 
*
gs z j                0<ζ<1           (9) 
Fiscal effort: 
0 1z z z u                z0>0 or z0<0; z1>0         (10) 
Public sector borrowing requirements: 
g gu i s                    (11) 
Intermediate imports: 
0 1km a a u       a0>0 or a0<0; 0< a1<1       (12) 
Capital goods imports: 
0 1zm m m i     m0>0 or m0<0; 0< m1<1      (13) 
Foreign saving: *
f k zs m m m j e g r                    (14) 
Three gap equations: 
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Growth-investment equation: 0
0
1
[ ][ ( )]
1
g
g g
i i u
k



  

       (15) 
Saving gap: *
1 1 0 0 0(1 ) ( )gi z u z j i                   (16) 
Foreign exchange gap:  
1 1 1 0 1 0 0(1 ) ( ) *gm i a m u m j m m i a e                   (17) 
Fiscal gap: *
1 0( )gi z u z j                                 (18) 
                                                                      
 
Table 2. Econometric results of the structural equations and the three-gap equations* 
                                                                      
Private investment: 
10.120 2.25 0.203 0.128p g gi i i u         
2 0.963R   
                    (-0.37) (1.07)  (-0.13)  (1.93)  
 
Private saving: 
1 10.005 0.328 0.221 0.751p ps u u s         
2 0.993R   
(-0.78)  (17.04)  (-4.91)    (7.03) 
 
Fiscal effort: 
10.006 0.011 1.03z u z                    
2 0.910R   
 (-1.10)  (1.42)  (10.34) 
Import demand: 
Intermediate goods 
              
10.0001 0.006 0.002km u u           
2 0.853R   
(0.02)  (3.13)   (0.87) 
 
Capital goods  
10.005 0.019 0.453z zm i m              
2 0.877R   
(2.68)  (3.43)   (-2.91) 
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Three-gap equations: 
Fiscal gap:          0.199 0.018gi u    
Saving gap:         0.083 0.065gi u     
Foreign exchange gap: 0.968 0.129gi u      
                                                                    
Notes: 
1. t-statistics are given in parenthesis under the coefficients, and the coefficients of 
determination (R2) are adjusted R2.  
2. All equations were tested and corrected for auto-correlation by B-G test. 
 
Table 3. China`s business cycles and probable causes, 1981-2009 
                                                                     
Year    Durable Time    Probable Causes                Illustration 
                                                                     
1981-1983     3             Unknown                     Unknown 
1983-1991     9      Chaos economic situation               Internal 
1991-1995     5     Three years of rectification, reform        Internal 
aimed at establishing a joint stock system 
1995-2000     5      Asian financial crises, 1997-1998         External 
2000-?        ?      Financial crises, 2007-2008              External 
                                                                     
Notes: author makes Table 3. 
 
Table 4. Projected Growth path scenarios (assumptions): 2010-2015 
                                                                    
Growth path scenarios 
                                                                   
Average    Base year        Max   Socially 
1981-2009     2005    2009  1981-  desirable 
                                                     2009  2010-2015 
                                           
I          II        III   IV       V   
Real growth rate (% period average): 
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  Actual GDP                            5.7             11.4           7.6     22.4  (2008)   7.1  
Potential GDP                            9.1             12.4          10.2     21.1  (2008)    9   
As % of potential output ( period average) 
Actual output (u, capacity utilization rate)      60.2            76.0          75.5     82.6  (1999)    85  
Private investment                        20.7             34.3         49.0      49.0  (2009)    40 
Gov. investment                          1.3              1.6          2.6       2.6  (2009)    1.59  
Private saving                           22.3              30.8         31.8      31.8  (2009)   34.6   
mz                                    0.006             0.011        0.008     0.012  (2006)   0.009 
mk                                    0.005             0.008        0.008     0.010  (2008)   0.007 
                                                                                                     
 
Table 5. Scenario Macroeconomic data: 2010–2015 
                                                                   
Year  GDP     X      Q       i       ip     ig     sp     z*     mk    mz 
                                                                            
2010  51,731  52, 203  70, 339  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  0.433  0.007  0.009 
2011  59,028  55, 909  76, 669  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  0.561  0.007  0.009 
2012  67,400  59, 879  83, 570  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  0.727  0.007  0.009 
2013  77,009  64, 130  91, 091  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  0.942  0.007  0.009 
2014  88,043  68, 683  99, 289  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  1.221  0.007  0.009 
2015  100,719 73, 560  108, 225  0.4159  0.400  0.0159  0.346  1.583  0.007  0.009 
                                                                            
Notes: 
1. *z=sg+debts paid by Gov. 
2. The units of GDP and X and Q are Hundred Million US Dollars, others are defined as a percentage of potential 
output (Q) 
 
APPENDIX 3: 
Govt. investment (as % of potential output) 
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Figure 1.  Macro imbalance in China`s economy between 1981 and 2009 
 
 
Figure 2.   The Ratios of taxes in private income, 1995-2009 
 
Notes:  
1. Data sources see Appendix.   
2. Yp indicates private income. 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Ta
xe
x/
Yp
Taxes/Yp
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
61 
 
Figure 3. Actual and potential growth rates of GDP, 1981-2009 
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